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NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: AVOIDANCE OF ANTI-HEARTBALM LEGISLATION BY
THE ACTION OF FRAUD
The heartbalm actions of alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduc-
tion and breach of promise of marriage were highly criticized because of their
misuse as a means of extortion. This criticism by both press and law reviews led
many states to abolish these actions. The prime target of this criticism was the
action of breach of promise. When the first anti-heartbalm statutes were passed,
it was predicted that these statutes might be circumvented by actions brought in
fraud and/or deceit.' However, until the decision in Langley v. Schumacker,2 all
the courts which have construed these statutes have consistently denied relief upon
such theories,3 and the rule evolved that:
" . .. [W]here an action stems from, or arises out of, a breach of a marriage contract,
the consequences of the statute abolishing actions for such a cause may not be avoided
by bringing an action in tort for fraud or deceit. ' 4
While this has been the rule elsewhere, the California Supreme Court has re-
fused to follow it. In Langley v. Schmnacker, the court, in a 4-3 decision, held
that a statute which abolished causes of action for breach of promise of marriage
was not intended to abolish causes of action for fraud. Therefore, a plaintiff who
alleges a promise of marriage made without any intention of performing it has
stated a good cause of action.
In the Langley case, the plaintiff went through a marriage ceremony with the
defendant, but the marriage was never consummated and she had the marriage
annulled. She then sued the defendant in an action of fraud, claiming that the
defendant had falsely represented his intent to marry her, to consummate the mar-
riage, and maintain normal marital relations. The plaintiff alleged that by relying
on the defendant's misrepresentation, she suffered actual damage due to loss of
employment and also that she suffered intense humiliation, mental anguish and
public disgrace, for which she sought exemplary damages. The defendant de-
murred, claiming that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by California Civil
Code section 43.5, subdivision (d) which provides that no cause of action arises
for breach of promise of marriage. The defendant's demurrer was sustained and
this was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal.
These facts presented three basic questions: (1) Was there a breach of prom-
ise? (2) Did the plaintiff state a cause of action for fraud? (3) Was the action
'Feinsinger, Alienation of Affections and Related Actions, 10 Wis. L. Rav. 417 (1935);
Note, 30 ILL. L. REv. 764, 780 (1936).
246 Cal.2d ........ 297 P.2d 977 (1956).
3A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Penn. 1940), aff'd, 123 F.2d 1017 (3rd Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941); Thibault v. Lamiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945);
Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1938). The only apparent incon-
sistency was Snyder v. Snyder, 172 Misc. 204, 14 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1939), where the defendant by
falsely representing he was single induced the plaintiff to enter into a bigamous marriage. The
court held that an action in deceit would lie; that an action to recover damages for consum-
mation of a bigamous marriage was not subject to abuse and manipulation by unscrupulous
persons and therefore not within the statute prohibiting an action for breach of promise. Thus
the court distinguished the case from Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, supra.
4 Annot., 158 A.L.R. 617, 624 (1945).
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of fraud barred by section 43.5, subdivision (d)? The California Supreme Court
confined its discussion to the last question, and held that Civil Code section 43.5,
subdivision (d) was intended to abolish only causes of action based upon breach
of contract. Therefore, the plaintiff's complaint, which stated a cause of action for
fraud, was not barred by the code.
Since the plaintiff and defendant had gone through a marriage ceremony, how
could there be a breach of promise of marriage? Because the marriage without
being consummated was subsequently annulled, and an annulment is a judicial
declaration that no valid marriage ever existed.5 The existence of certain facts at
the time of the purported marriage prevents the relationship of man and wife from
being established. In this respect an annulment differs from a divorce, which is the
dissolution of a valid marriage.6 The plaintiff's annulment, then, rendered the
marriage void ab initio. Since no marriage occurred, the defendant failed to per-
form his promise to marry the plaintiff, and the plaintiff would have had a cause
of action for breach of promise had this action not been abolished.
The court without discussion assumed that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action for fraud. Thus the court assumed the very question before it, for if the
plaintiff did not state a cause of action for fraud, the trial court properly sustained
the defendant's demurrer.
Did the plaintiff state a cause of action for fraud? An unfulfilled promise can-
not form the basis of an action for fraud,7 because the misrepresentation must be
of an existing or pre-existing fact. However, an unfulfilled promise made without
intent to perform can be the basis of an action for fraud.8 "The essence of the
fraud... is not the breach of the promise, but the fraudulent intent not to per-
form."9 Therefore, if a promise made without intent to perform can form the basis
of an action of fraud, can an unenforceable promise made without intent to per-
form be the basis of such an action? Upon this question the authorities are in con-
flict. The Restatement of Torts takes the position that an action for fraud may be
based upon an unenforceable promise made without intent to perform; 10 but the
Restatement of Contracts" is of the opinion that such a promise may not form the
basis of an action for fraud." The question has not been decided by the California
Supreme Court,12 and it was not discussed in Langley v. Schumacker, but Cali-
fornia appears to be in line with that authority which does not allow an action of
fraud to be based upon an unenforceable promise made without intent to per-
form.'3 Kroger v. Baur,'4 a decision of the California District Court of Appeals,
appears to be the only case directly in point. This decision held that an unenforce-
able oral promise cannot form the basis of an action for fraud. The court stated:
5 1 VERNIER, AwumcAN FAMImy LAW § 50 (1931).
6 Ibid.
7Feeney v. Howard, 79 Cal. 525, 21 Pac. 984 (1889) ; PRossER, ToRTs § 90 (2d ed. 1955).
8 CALIF. CIv. CODE § 1572 (4).
9 Reton v. Millar, 132 CalApp. 708, 712, 23 P.2d 419, 420 (1933).
10 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 530, Comment b.
11 REsTATEMENT, CoNTmcs § 473, comment d.
12 In Bank of America v. Pendergrass, 4 Cal.2d 258, 48 P.2d 659 (1935), the California
Supreme Court held that where the parol evidence rule renders a promise unenforceable such
a promise made without intent to perform cannot be used to establish the defense of fraud.
13 1 WrrIN, SuM:mRy or CALIFORNIA LAw, ToRTS 158 (6th ed. 1946) ; Note, 36 CA.F.
L. REv. 138 (1948).
1446 CalApp.2d 801, 117 P.2d 50 (1941).
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"If the law can thus be nullified by the transparent device of predicating a tort action
upon the invalid oral promise on the ground that the promisee did not intend to per-
form it, then such might just as well be stricken from the statute." 15
If a statute which makes an oral promise unenforceable cannot be evaded by
bringing an action for fraud, then certainly a statute which makes a promise un-
enforceable cannot be avoided by bringing such an action. A promise of marriage
is an unenforceable promise, and therefore such a promise should not form the
basis of an action for fraud. Hence it would seem that the plaintiff failed to state
a cause of action, and that the trial court properly sustained the defendant's
demurrer.
Even assuming that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for fraud, did the
statute, which abolished actions for breach of promise of marriage, abolish an
action for breach of promise of marriage made without intent to perform?
The action for breach of promise in the past has been used as a means of extor-
tion.16 Oftentimes, the promise of marriage was no more than wishful thinking on
the part of a designing female. However, because of the large awards made to a
"pretty" plaintiff, and the widespread publicity given the embarrassing evidence
admitted, the mere threat to bring such a suit was apt to bring about a settle-
ment.17 The decision in Langley v. Sckumacker makes extortion possible by the
simple device of alleging a promise of marriage made without intent to perform.'8
True, the plaintiff, if forced to go to court, must prove the fraudulent intent as well
as the promise, but an action of the type under discussion
"... [I]s essentially a sort in which service of the summons, or merely the threat to
to do so is often sufficient to cause a settlement even when there is not any merit to the
alleged cause of action .... [T]o effect the prohibition enacted by the legislatures it
will prove necessary to bar actions which though tortious in form are contractual in
essence. That is, it will prove necessary to guard against resort to the action of deceit
as a subterfuge and attempt to circumvent the statutory probition."'19
According to the decision in Langley v. Schurnacker, section 43.5, subdivi-
sion (d) was only intended to abolish causes of action for breach of contract. That
is, the legislature intended to abolish only actions ex contractu, not ex delicto.
Yet the action for breach of promise of marriage more closely resembles an action
in tort than it does one of contract.2 0 For example, malicious interference with the
contract of another is a tort, but such interference with the contract to marry is
not a tort.21 In this respect the action differs from the ordinary contract. Also, the
15 Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal.App.2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941).
16 1 VERN=R, AmERICAN FAmrny LAW § 50 (1931).
17 A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Penn. 1940) ; Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div.
103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1938).
1 8 Ibid
19 A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Penn. 1940).
20 "In cases of breach of promise . . . although the wrong arises primarily through the
breaking of a contract [it] so nearly approximates that of strictly a tortious character, that the
former are differentiated from actions of tort more in the degree and extent of the injury than
from any actual or intrinsic distinction." Lanigan v. Neely, 4 Cal.App. 760, 767, 89 Pac. 441,
444 (1907). "While an action to recover damages for a breach of promise of marriage, in a
technical sense, arises out of the breach of the contract obligation, it is in its essence an attempt
to recover for a tortious wrong." Reiger v. Abrams, 98 Wash. 72, 77, 167 Pac. 76, 78 (1917).
"The principal ground of damage is disappointed hope, the injury complained of is violated
faith, more resembling in substance deceit and fraud, than a mere common breach of promise."
Stebbins v. Palmer, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 71, 79 (1822).
219 Am. Jtr. § 18 (1937).
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general rule is that actions in contract survive the death of one of the parties, while
actions in tort do not. The action of breach of promise does not survive the death
of one of the parties, and therefore follows the rule applicable to torts.2 Further-
more, the action of breach of promise permits recovery for injury to feelings, repu-
tation, mental distress, and other items of a tortious character.m Also the tort rule
permitting recovery of exemplary damages is followed, rather than the rule of
contracts which permits recovery of compensatory damages only.2A At common
law a woman had no cause of action for her own seduction. Yet in those jurisdic-
tions following the common law, this seduction could be pleaded in aggravation of
damages in an action for breach of promise. In such a case the breach of the prom-
ise did not cause the seduction, but rather the seducer's path is paved by the
promise of marriage. Seduction by such means is looked upon as a tort for which
the defendant must pay. In California, prior to the passage of Civil Code section
43.5 seduction was a tort against the woman seduced. However, this seduction
could be pleaded in an action for breach of promise without constituting a mis-
joinder of actions, for as to damages the action of breach of promise was a tort.25
Breach of promise is an anomalous action it partakes both of tort and con-
tract. Therefore a statute which abolishes the action should not be construed as
abolishing only actions based upon breach of contract, but rather, these statutes
should be interpreted so as to give effect to the legislative purpose.
A.B. v. C.D. 26 was a similar case of an action of fraud based upon a promise
of marriage made without intent to perform. The promise of marriage was made
by a Pennsylvania gentleman to a lady of New York and both these states had
statutes abolishing the action of breach of promise. The Federal District Court in
interpreting both these statutes found the legislative intent was to abolish actions
brought in tort as well as contract. The court stated:
"(T]here is a policy enunciated by these enactments abolishing breach of promise
actions which is broader than their letter. The legislatures evidently have been
prompted by concern for the public morals and for the frequently innocent victims
of breach of promise actions to preclude resort to the courts for relief from injury
consequent to breached promises of marriage .... The legislatures did not intend the
courts should explore the minds of suitors and determine their sincerity at the moment
of proposal of marriage, but rather declared it to be the policy of the state that in the
event a breach of promise occurs relief will be denied in the courts." 27
While the misuse of the action of breach of promise was largely responsible
for its abolishment, serious doubt existed as to the wisdom of permitting such an
action even when properly used.28 It was argued that an action of breach of prom-
ise may have had a useful function in a society which considered a wife little more
than chattel, and therefore a proper subject for a commercial contract. But classi-
fication of the engagement with ordinary commercial contracts is not in accord-
ance with the more enlightened view of the function of the engagement. In an
earlier period, marriages were arranged by the families of the prospective spouses.
22 1 VERN, R, AmaicA F. mmy LAW § 10 (1931).
2 Id. at § 9.
24 CAIF. CoDo Civ. Paoc. § 374, Lannigan v. Neely, 4 CalApp. 760, 89 Pac. 441 (1907).
25 Lannigan v. Neely, supra note 24.
20 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Penn. 1940).
27 Id. at 87.
28 1 VERNIER, AzsRIcAw FAmiy LA W § 6 (1931) ; Brockelbank, The Nature of a Promise
to Marry, 41 ILL. L. REV. 1, 199 (1946).
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